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OCEAN PLANNING AND THE GULF OF MAINE: 
EXPLORING BI-NATIONAL POLICY OPTIONS 
Lucia Fanning*  
Rita Heimes** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the twenty-five years since a special Chamber of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its decision in the Delimitation 
of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Gulf of Maine 
Case),1 legal scholars have written extensively on the significance of the 
ruling to influence Canada-U.S. relations specifically, and international 
arbitration in general.2  While the rationale behind any particular 
scholar’s interest in the case has varied over the years, its significance in 
informing deliberation surrounding maritime boundary delimitation owes 
much to the fact that the case presented many “firsts.”  Among these 
were: the use of a special Chamber of the Court;3 the decision by Canada 
to submit the dispute to an international tribunal on its own behalf;4 and 
the request that a decision be made on a “single maritime boundary” that 
would include, not only the seabed beyond the limits of the territorial 
                                            
 * Associate Professor, School for Resource and Environmental Studies, and 
Director of the Marine Affairs Program, Faculty of Management, Dalhousie University. 
 ** Research Professor and Director of the Center for Law & Innovation, University 
of Maine School of Law. 
 1. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.) 
1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12) [hereinafter Gulf of Maine Case]. 
 2. See generally L.H. Legault & D.M. McRae, The Gulf of Maine Case, 22 CAN. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 267 (1984) (providing examples of a comprehensive analysis of the 
decision and its implications); Edward Collins & Martin Rogoff, The Gulf of Maine Case 
and the Future of Ocean Boundary Delimitation, 38 ME. L. REV. 1 (1986); Davis 
Robinson, David Colson & Bruce Rashkow, Some Perspectives on Adjudicating Before 
the World Court: The Gulf of Maine Case, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 578 (1985).  
 3. See R. Brauer, International Conflict Resolution: The ICJ Chamber and the Gulf 
of Maine Dispute, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 463 (1982-1983). 
 4. See Erik Wang, Adjudication of Canada-United States Disputes, 19 CAN. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 158 (1983). 
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sea, but also the water column.5  In addition to its uniqueness, the 
significance of this request for a single boundary to delineate both seabed 
and fisheries resources has led many scholars, and even one of the judges 
of the Chamber, to question the legality and appropriateness of the 
request.6   
As only the third case of maritime boundary delimitation to be heard 
by the Court at the time, the Gulf of Maine Case highlighted the 
Chamber’s novel use of a hierarchy of principles, equitable criteria, and 
practical methods in reaching its decision.7  At the same time, it has been 
subject to much criticism.8  Commentators have noted that the challenge 
of maritime boundary delimitation is to “reconcile conflicting claims to a 
maritime extension of coasts that differ in configuration, length and 
position in relation to the area to be delimited.”9  While solutions to this 
problem have been attempted in decisions rendered by the Chamber10 
and the full Court11 over its sixty-five year history,12 assessing these 
judgments for guidance on maritime boundary delimitation is not the aim 
of this Article.  Rather, its purpose is to focus on the issues confronting 
Canada and the United States after the Gulf of Maine decision was 
                                            
 5. SPECIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA TO SUBMIT TO A CHAMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE THE DELIMITATION OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY OF THE GULF OF MAINE AREA, 
Article 2 (2), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES 
/PDFFILES/TREATIES/CAN-USA1979MB.PDF. 
 6. Judge Gros, one of the five judges of the Chamber, questioned how the parties 
could relieve themselves from the obligation of Article 6 of the 1958 United Nation 
Convention on the Continental Shelf simply by asking the Court to rule on a single 
boundary for both the seabed and the water column. He contended that since Article 6 
called for the principle of equidistance to be applied in delimiting the seabed, in theory, 
two boundaries, one for the seabed and one for the water column, could be a likely 
outcome. The Chamber concluded that Article 6 was not applicable to the delimitation of 
a single maritime boundary.  Gulf of Maine Case, 1984 I.C.J. at 365 (Gros, J., dissenting). 
 7. See Legault & McRae, supra note 2 at 289. 
 8. See Ted McDorman, Phillip Saunders & David VanderZwaag, The Gulf of Maine 
Boundary: Dropping Anchor or Setting a Course, 9 MARINE POLICY, 90 (1985); L. Clain, 
Gulf of Maine: A Disappointing First in the Delimitation of a Single Maritime Boundary, 
25 VA J. INT’L L. 521 (1985); David Colson, The Delimitation of the Outer Continental 
Shelf between Neighboring States, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 91 (2003).   
 9. See Legault & McRae, supra note 2 at 289. 
 10. See e.g., Gulf of Maine Case,1984 I.C.J. 246. 
 11. See e.g., Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18 
(Feb. 24); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20). 
 12. The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations.  It was established in June 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations and began 
work in April 1946. 
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rendered and to explore how these two “friendly” neighboring states 
have attempted to pursue the principles of cooperation and agreement 
following the decision of the Court.13  
As such, this Article is structured around five key components and is 
aimed at: (1) highlighting the underlying economic rationale behind why 
the two neighboring countries of Canada and the United States sought to 
clarify a single maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine; (2) identifying 
the challenges confronting the parties in managing their ocean resources, 
after ownership had been established, particularly in light of growing 
energy-related exploitation demands; (3) discussing mechanisms for 
ocean planning and management adopted by each party to utilize its 
living and non-living resources; (4) presenting two examples of existing 
bilateral cooperation from which lessons can be gleaned for future 
collaborative efforts; and (5) identifying policy options and an 
implementation mechanism for transboundary cooperation in the Gulf of 
Maine that could potentially meet the objectives of both countries as they 
seek to implement marine spatial planning in their respective maritime 
zones.  
II. THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR PURSUING A BOUNDARY 
DELIMITATION DECISION IN THE GULF OF MAINE 
While evidence exists of sentiments of national pride and national 
honor being aroused by threats to territory14 and some scholars have 
pointed to the psychological importance of territory that exceeds its 
intrinsic value,15 it is clear that the exponential expansion of ocean 
territory by coastal states has arisen primarily over securing access to 
offshore resources.  Key among these are fisheries resources, 
hydrocarbon deposits, and, more recently, the production of renewable 
forms of energy using wind, tides, and currents.  
Canada and the United States have disputed each other’s maritime 
boundary claims in all three of their shared ocean spaces.16  To date, the 
                                            
 13. In the Gulf of Maine Case, the Chamber referred to the historical friendliness and 
cooperation between Canada and the United States and expressed confidence that the 
“parties will surely be able to surmount any difficulties and take the right steps to ensure 
the positive development of their activities . . . .”  Gulf of Maine Case, 1984 I.C.J. at 344. 
 14. See A.O. CUKWURAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967). 
 15. See e.g., EVAN LUARD, THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FRONTIER DISPUTES 
(1970). 
 16. These include the disputed triangle in the Beaufort Sea in the Arctic, Juan de Fuca 
Strait between Washington State and Vancouver Island, Dixon Entrance, south of the 
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parties have sought clarification from an available international dispute 
resolution mechanism, such as the International Court of Justice, only in 
the Gulf of Maine disputed area17 and the evidence strongly suggests that 
that the driver behind this decision was economic in nature.18  While the 
parties called for a single maritime boundary to be drawn from the coast 
two hundred miles seaward, within the 90,000 square kilometer Gulf of 
Maine, the focus of the dispute was identified as Georges Bank, over 
which ownership of some forty-two percent of the Bank was in dispute.19 
Georges Bank is a broad, shallow, detached marine area of 
approximately 45,000 square kilometers (300 km x 150 km) located on 
the continental shelf seaward of the Gulf of Maine but within the 
delimitation area, off the coasts of Massachusetts and Southwestern 
Nova Scotia.  Water depths are less than 100 meters over most of the 
Bank.  The area has been studied by Canadian and American researchers 
for more than 100 years and the existing scientific knowledge has been 
well documented and summarized.20  
On October 12, 1984, the ICJ ruled on the single maritime boundary 
dispute between Canada and the United States, granting Canada the 
water column and seabed of approximately twenty-five percent of the 
                                                                                                  
Alaskan panhandle and north of Canada’s Queen Charlotte Islands in the Pacific, and the 
area near Machias Seal Island, as well as the disputed area in the Gulf of Maine (settled 
by the ICJ in 1984).  
 17. As noted by Jonathan Charney, third party international dispute settlement has 
increased dramatically with the development of the dispute settlement system in the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and its coming into force in November 
1994.  The Convention encourages parties to settle their disputes by means of their 
mutual choice, including negotiations and voluntary conciliation.  The forums available 
include the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice, arbitration, 
and special arbitration (for disputes involving fisheries, the marine environment, marine 
scientific research and navigation).  See Jonathan Charney, The Implications of 
Expanding Dispute Settlement Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 90 
AM. J. INT’L L. 69 (1996). 
 18. See generally Collins & Rogoff, supra note 2, at 2-7 (providing a summary of the 
economic importance of the area to both Canada and the United States); the Memorial of 
Canada (Can v. US), 1982 I.C.J. Pleadings 1 (Sept. 27, 1982) [hereinafter Canadian 
Memorial]; Annexes to the Memorial of Canada  (Can v. US), 1982 I.C.J. Pleadings 1 
(Sept. 27, 1982); the Memorial of the United States (Can. v US), 1982 I.C.J. Pleadings 1 
(Sept. 27, 1982) [hereinafter United States Memorial]; DAVID VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH 
FEUD: THE US AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY DISPUTE (1983). 
 19. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.) 
1984 I.C.J. 246, 272 (Oct. 12). 
 20. See RICHARD BACKUS, GEORGES BANK (Donald Bourne ed., 1987); P.R. Boudreau 
et al., The Possible Environmental Impacts of Petroleum Exploration Activities on the 
Georges Bank Ecosystem, 2259 CAN. TECH. REP. FISH. AQUAT. SCI. (1999). 
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Gulf of Maine and more importantly, an area of approximately 7000 
square kilometers on Georges Bank.  The decision to refer the dispute to 
the ICJ for a final and binding decision followed questions of ownership 
over both fishing and hydrocarbon resources.  In the case of the fishery 
resources, overlapping areas became evident21 when each of the two 
nations responded to extensive foreign fishing pressures by claiming in 
legislation 200 nautical mile (nm) exclusive fishing zones (EFZ) in the 
mid-to-late 1970s.22  Disagreement over the seabed arose following the 
claiming of exclusive jurisdiction over the non-living resources of the 
continental shelf in 194523 and the subsequent granting of hydrocarbon 
permits by Canada in 1964.24 
The Canadian government leased the first parcel of land on Georges 
Bank to Texaco Canada Inc. in 1964.  By 1986, Chevron, BP-Amoco and 
Texaco held large exploration permits covering the East Georges Bank 
Basin.  These permits covered the entire Canadian portion of the Bank 
and in the case of BP-Amoco leases, extended off the Bank into deeper 
waters.  In 1986, efforts by Texaco, aimed at soliciting public support for 
exploratory activities, coincided with the call for a provincial election. 
This resulted in political pressure being applied by the fishing 
constituency in the Southwestern portion of the province.25  The power of 
the fishing constituency led to a political decision by the federal and 
provincial governments imposing a thirteen-year moratorium on 
petroleum activity on the Canadian portion of Georges Bank.26  
                                            
 21. See Glen Herbert, Fishery Relations in the Gulf of Maine: Implications of an 
Arbitrated Maritime Boundary 19 MAR. POL. 301 (1995). 
 22. See Fishery Conservation and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 
(1976) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (2007)); Territorial Sea and 
Fishing Zones Act, Fishing Zones of Canada (Zones 4 and 5) Order, C.R.C. 1548, P.C. 
1977-1, (1977). 
 23. Pres. Proc. No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural 
Resources of the Subsoil and Seabed of the Continental Shelf, 3 C.F.R. § 39 (1945 Supp.) 
[hereinafter the Truman Declaration]. 
 24.  See generally Canadian Memorial, supra note 18, at 92-99 (discussing the claims 
by the two countries and the failure to reach agreement bilaterally); United States 
Memorial, supra note 18, at 81-86 (discussing the same). 
 25. An appreciation for the publicity and tension surrounding the 1987 debate to allow 
oil and gas exploration on Georges Bank can be gleaned from the following samples of 
headlines from newspaper articles at the time: Risking the priceless fishery of Georges 
Bank to bring up more oil, GLOBE AND MAIL, January 17, 1987; Opening Georges Bank 
to firms would lure Americans, DAILY COMMERCIAL NEWS, November 11, 1987; 
Battlelines clearly drawn on Georges Bank dispute, ATLANTIC INSIGHT, January 1988. 
 26. The prohibition was legislatively mandated in the 1987 Canada-Nova Scotia 
Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation (Nova Scotia) Act and its federal 
counterpart, the 1988 Canada-Nova Scotia Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation 
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Following the conclusion of a Public Panel Review in 1999,27 the 
moratorium was subsequently extended to December 2012.28  This 
decision resulted in both the U.S. and Canadian portions of Georges 
Bank being subject to a ban on petroleum-related activities.   
In the United States, ten exploratory wells were drilled on the 
undisputed U.S. portion of Georges Bank between 1976 and 1982.  This 
activity was associated with the only successful lease offering by the 
United States for the Georges Bank area.29  None of the wells 
encountered significant concentrations of petroleum resources.  Starting 
in 1982, the U.S. Congress enacted a series of one-year leasing moratoria 
on portions of the Outer Continental Shelf.  This eventually led to an 
executive order by President William J. Clinton in 1998, preventing any 
leases from being offered for a period of fourteen years, in areas that 
were currently under moratorium.  While there are no outstanding leases 
on the U.S. portion of the Bank, the three leaseholders on the Canadian 
portion of the Bank continue to hold exclusive exploration rights.  
However, these are suspended while the moratorium remains in effect.30 
                                                                                                  
Act.  See Canada-Nova Scotia Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation (Nova 
Scotia) Act, S.N.S. 1987, c. 3 (1987); Canada-Nova Scotia Petroleum Resources Accord 
Implementation Act, S.C. 1988, c. 28 (1988). 
 27. Reflecting the growing recognition of public involvement in decision-making, the 
legislation also called for a public review to be established prior to the termination date of 
the moratorium.  The review panel was authorized to examine the environmental and 
socio-economic impacts associated with exploration and drilling on Georges Bank and to 
make its recommendation to the responsible federal and provincial Ministers by July 1, 
1999.  The Ministers were charged with making a decision, prior to January 1, 2000, on 
whether the moratorium would be extended.  In keeping with the legislative requirements 
in both the federal and provincial Accord Acts, a review process was conducted to 
examine the issues associated with oil and gas exploration on Georges Bank.  Following 
the review process, the three-member panel recommended the extension of the 
moratorium.  MULLALLY ET AL., GEORGES BANK REVIEW PANEL REPORT (1999), available 
at http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/pdfs/ georgesbankreport.pdf.  
 28. See Government of Nova Scotia, Petroleum Directorate, Georges Bank 
Moratorium Extended, Dec. 22, 1999, http://www.gov.ns.ca/news/ 
details.asp?id=19991222004. 
 29. Federal Offshore Lease Sale 42 was held on December 18, 1979.  It resulted in the 
leasing of sixty-three blocks to companies.  The total value of the leases was 
$816,516,546.  Estimates of the hydrocarbon resources for this sale did not include the 
disputed area, and were given by the U.S. Department of the Interior as 123 million 
barrels of oil and 870 billion cubic feet of natural gas.  GARY EDSON ET AL., U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, GEORGES BANK PETROLEUM EXPLORATION: ATLANTIC OUTER 
CONTINENTAL SHELF (2000), available at http://www.gomr.mms.gov/PDFs/2000/2000-
031.pdf. 
 30. See Lucia Fanning, Understanding Influence: Lessons from Canada’s and Nova 
Scotia’s 1999 Georges Bank Moratorium Decision, 23 OCEAN Y.B. 119 (2009) 
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Technological advances at the time of, and subsequent to, the 1945 
Truman Declaration31 clearly presented opportunities to exploit the 
hydrocarbon resources believed to be present on Georges Bank.  
However, the lack of drilling success, coupled with the political strength 
of the fishing sector in both Canada and the United States, significantly 
reduced the economic role of the petroleum sector as a key driver behind 
boundary delimitation at the time.  Rather, the evidence more likely 
supports the role of Georges Bank as an important and traditional fishing 
ground for Canadian and U.S. fishers, due to its uniquely high biological 
productivity, as the principal economic driver behind the pursuit for a 
binding decision by the ICJ.   
Georges Bank has been reported to sustain levels of fish productivity 
two to three times greater than comparable continental shelf areas, such 
as the Gulf of Maine, Scotian Shelf, and North Sea.32  However, as with 
the conflicting claims over the ownership of the seabed, the two 
countries also claimed 200 nautical mile EFZs in 1977, which resulted in 
overlapping boundaries.  In 1978, both countries suspended the 
implementation of a 1977 Interim Fishing Agreement that allowed 
fishers from both countries access to areas in which they had 
traditionally fished, regardless of the newly-established EFZ 
boundaries.33  In an attempt to resolve the disputes, a treaty34 was signed 
by both countries in 1979 to submit the delimitation of the maritime 
boundary and an Agreement on East Coast Fishery Resources35 to 
binding dispute settlement.  The linking of the two issues required them 
both to be ratified by each country for either to come into force.  
However, the linkage was subsequently severed in 1981, due to massive 
opposition from the U.S. fishing industry in New England over the terms 
of the agreement.36  Canada agreed to proceed with the boundary dispute 
                                                                                                  
(providing a comprehensive examination of the factors influencing the decision to extend 
the petroleum moratorium on Canadian side of Georges Bank).  
 31. Truman Declaration, supra note 23. 
 32. See BACKUS, supra note 20; Boudreau et al., supra note 20.  See also E.B. Cohen 
& M.D. Grosslein, Production on Georges Bank Compared With Other Shelf Ecosystem, 
in RICHARD BACKUS, GEORGES BANK 382 (Donald Bourne ed., 1987); Gardner Pinfold 
Consulting Economists Ltd., Georges Bank Resources: An Economic Profile (1998). 
 33. Canada-USA, Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement between the Government of 
Canada and the Government of the United States of America (Feb. 24, 1977). 
 34. Treaty to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime 
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area,U.S.-Can., Mar. 10, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10204. 
 35. Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United 
States of America on East Coast Fishery Resources, S. Exec. Doc. V, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1979). 
 36. Herbert, supra note 21, at 308. 
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settlement treaty37 without the Fishery Agreement, and Memorials38 from 
both countries were submitted to the ICJ in 1982, along with the Special 
Agreement by the parties to submit the boundary question to a Chamber 
of the ICJ, rather than the full Court.39 
With the establishment of the ICJ boundary, known as ‘the Hague 
line’ in 1984, the jurisdictional issue between the two countries was 
resolved, with Canada receiving approximately one-sixth of the total area 
of Georges Bank, including the rich scallop and fishing areas known as 
the Northeast Peak and the Northern edge.40  However, as has been noted 
by scholars since and experienced by resource managers for the two 
countries, the problem of managing Georges Bank’s transboundary 
fishery resources remained.41  Furthermore, since the ICJ decision in 
1984, approaches recommended for managing coastal and marine 
resources have evolved from a single sector focus to integrated 
management across sectors, incorporating sustainable development 
principles of ecosystem-based management, the precautionary approach, 
and public participation.  Part III of this Article highlights some of the 
challenges confronting the parties in managing a mature sector such as 
fisheries and a newly emerging sector such as renewable energies within 
the Gulf of Maine. 
III. POST-HAGUE LINE DECISION CHALLENGES FOR OCEAN RESOURCE 
UTILIZATION IN THE GULF OF MAINE 
While the 1984 ICJ “Hague Line” decision resolved the question 
presented to the Court regarding the establishment of a single maritime 
boundary in the Gulf of Maine, many of the practical issues surrounding 
the management of shared resources remained.  Despite the expectation 
by the Court that the two parties would work collaboratively to resolve 
these issues,42 numerous incidents of U.S. vessels illegally fishing in 
Canadian waters were recorded.43  Given the importance of resource 
                                            
 37. The Treaty came into force on November 20, 1981.  See Collins & Rogoff, supra 
note 2, at 5. 
 38. See Canadian Memorial and United States Memorial, supra note 18. 
 39. See SPECIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, supra note 
5. 
 40. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.) 
1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12). 
 41. See e.g., Emily Pudden & David VanderZwaag, Canada-USA Bilateral Fisheries 
Management in the Gulf of Maine: Under the Radar Screen, 16 RECIEL 36 (2007). 
 42. Gulf of Maine Case, 1984 I.C.J. at 344. 
 43. See Herbert, supra note 21. 
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allocation, and specifically fisheries resources, as a key driver behind the 
pursuit of a binding settlement, it is appropriate to briefly describe the 
challenges and efforts undertaken to overcome them in the years 
following the decision.  Additionally, this section will highlight some of 
the challenging issues that could arise from emerging ocean uses such as 
renewable energy exploitation and the efforts by both countries to seize 
existing opportunities within the Gulf of Maine.44 
A. The Fisheries 
As described by Emily Pudden and Professor David VanderZwaag, 
fisheries management continued to be handled in a unilateral manner by 
Canada and the United States in the years immediately following the ICJ 
decision.45  This persisted as the norm until 1995, when the continuing 
collapse of groundfish stocks on both sides of the line resulted in the 
establishment of the Canada-U.S. Steering Committee.  This non-
legislative, bilateral, advisory body is co-chaired by the Canadian 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) Regional Director General 
(Maritimes Region) and the United States Northeast Regional 
Administrator, National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).  In an effort 
to manage the three transboundary groundfish stocks of Georges Bank—
cod, haddock, and yellow flounder—the Committee has the mandate of 
conducting joint stock assessments and recommending a sharing 
agreement for the total allowable catch (TAC) for these stocks.  Since its 
formation, and following the success of the first joint stock assessment 
for cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder conducted in 1997, a number 
of institutional arrangements have evolved under the auspices of the 
Steering Committee.  Today, the work of the Committee is undertaken 
by the species-specific46 Transboundary Resources Assessment 
                                            
 44. Since both countries implemented unilateral moratoria regarding offshore oil and 
gas exploitation in the Outer Continental Shelf at the time of the ICJ decision or soon 
thereafter, this Article will not discuss the petroleum sector efforts undertaken within 
each country.  While no hydrocarbon exploitation has occurred on either side of the 
Hague Line to date, there is no longer a moratorium on the U.S. side as President Obama 
lifted the Executive Withdrawal on Offshore Lands on July 14, 2008, and, on October 1, 
2008, the Congressional moratorium was allowed to expire.  For a discussion on the 
Canadian decision to place a moratorium on oil and gas exploration on Georges Bank to 
December 2012, see Fanning, supra note 30.  
 45. Pudden & VanderZwaag supra note 41, at 36. 
 46. In addition to the three transboundary species of cod, haddock, and yellowtail 
flounder, joint assessment for herring, mackerel, halibut, dogfish, and pollock have either 
been agreed to or are being considered by the bilateral Steering Committee.  See id. at 37. 
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Committee (TRACs) which provides technical advice to the 
Transboundary Management Guidance Committee (TMGC).  The 
TMGC, in turn, provides advice on the status of the stocks and a 
proposed sharing of the TACs to the Canada-U.S. Integration Committee 
whose mandate is to ensure the integration of policies and consistency in 
approach across the TMGC and other working groups of the Steering 
Committee, including the Oceans, Habitat, and Species at Risk working 
groups.   
Agreement on the sharing formula by the two countries required 
some degree of compromise as the United States placed more weight on 
historical landings while Canada favored distribution of the resource.  
Consensus was reached on the sharing formula that provided for a seven-
year transitional schedule, with allocation percentages that take into 
account both contemporary resource distribution and historical utilization 
patterns.47  The implementation of the recommended allocation in each 
country occurs through the inclusion of the TAC in the respective 
fisheries management plans, issued under the authority of the DFO (for 
Canada) and the New England Fisheries Management Council (NEFMC) 
(for the United States).  The TMGC submits its recommendations to the 
NEFMC, while in Canada, it liaises with the Gulf of Maine Advisory 
Council (GOMAC), comprised of federal and provincial government 
representatives, as well as the fishing industry and the Canadian Consul 
in Boston, who makes the recommendation to the Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans.  However, it is important to note that the responsible 
agencies are not required to implement the recommendations of the 
Canada-U.S. Bilateral Steering Committee and may opt to increase, 
decrease, or maintain the status quo levels for each of the transboundary 
species in their respective fisheries management plans.48  
                                            
 47. Id. at 38. 
 48. The Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery Management Plan (FMP) specifies a 
procedure for setting annual hard TAC levels for the U.S./Canada Management Area for 
GB cod (Gadus morhua), GB haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus), and GB yellowtail 
flounder (Limanda ferruginea).  This action is needed to ensure that the stocks of GB 
cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder that are shared between the United States and 
Canada, are managed as required by the FMP and as outlined in the U.S./Canada 
Resource Sharing Understanding (Understanding). The Understanding specifies an 
allocation of TAC for these three stocks for each country, based on a formula that 
considers historical catch percentages and current resource distribution.  The purpose of 
this action is to implement TACs for these three stocks that will be consistent with the 
Understanding and the FMP.  For an understanding of the process to implement the 
recommendations on the U.S. side of the Hague Line in 2008, see Northeast Multispecies 
Fishery Management Plan, Specification of FY 2008 Total Allowable Catches for Eastern 
Georges Bank (GB) Cod, Eastern GB Haddock, and GB Yellowtail Flounder in the 
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Apart from agreement on the management and sharing of allocation 
of the transboundary resources, another significant challenge confronting 
the two countries as a result of the establishment of the Hague Line was 
the issue of illegal fishing, particularly on the Canadian side.  Non-
compliance with the boundary line rose to a peak in 1989, spurred by the 
discrepancy in the penalties for illegal fishing.49  In the United States, the 
maximum fine under the Lacey Act50 was $10,000, while in Canada, the 
penalties included a fine of $100,000, confiscation of the catch, seizure 
of the vessel, and possible imprisonment.51  To address this problem, the 
“Agreement between the Government of the United States and Canada 
on Fisheries Enforcement” was negotiated between the two countries in 
1990,52 making it illegal for nationals of one nation to not respect the 
laws and regulations of the other nation if operating within the 
jurisdiction of that nation.  The Agreement, which included consistency 
with the stricter Canadian penalties, was implemented through each 
country’s national legislation,53 and included regular cooperation, sharing 
of monitoring, control, and surveillance information, and joint patrolling 
along the Hague Line. 54  The outcome of the Agreement has been 
positive, with the number of violations decreasing substantial since its 
introduction.55  Additionally, due to a shared commitment to rebuild the 
stocks in the Gulf of Maine, management efforts have facilitated a 
                                                                                                  
U.S./Canada Management Area--Final Environmental Assessment--Regulatory Impact 
Review Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. NMFS (February 2008). 
 49. See Herbert, supra note 21. 
 50. Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378 (1982). 
 51. Pudden & VanderZwaag, supra note 41, at 40. 
 52. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 
THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA ON FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 26, 1990, H.R. 
Doc. No. 102-22 (1st Sess. 1990). 
 53. The United States has implemented the agreement by issuing the International 
Fisheries Regulations, U.S.-Canada Fisheries Enforcement, 50 C.F.R. §§ 300.140–
300.144 (1996); Canada implemented the agreement with the United States Waters 
Fisheries Regulations, SOR/91-660, revoked and subsumed by United States Waters 
Fisheries Regulations, revocation Fishery (General) Regulations, amendment, SOR/94-
296. 
 54. DFO and NOAA are committed to working closely together to coordinate and 
ensure the effective delivery of fishery law enforcement programs along the international 
boundaries.  Representatives from both agencies expressed the need to continue sharing 
information in order to improve the effectiveness of enforcement programs.  MELANIE 
KING, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CONCERNING LIVING MARINE 
RESOURCES OF INTEREST TO NOAA FISHERIES, 118 (2009), available at 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/docs/2009_ lnternational_agreements.pdf. 
 55. Herbert, supra note 21, at 315. 
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reduced number of vessels operating in areas close to the boundary line 
due to closures on the U.S. side to scallop fishers.  Even with a limited 
re-opening, there have been no reports of illegal fishing in the area.56  
In assessing the challenges and actions arising from the 
establishment of the Hague Line with regard to fisheries resources, it is 
tempting to conclude that the collaborative, voluntary, and mandatory 
practices implemented by Canada and the United States were exactly 
those which the Chamber had in mind when it voiced its hope for 
cooperation and agreement by the two parties.57  To that end, it would 
appear that there are valuable lessons other states can learn from the 
behavior of Canada and the United States, notwithstanding the call for a 
greater commitment by the two countries to an integrated transboundary 
ecosystem management approach in the Gulf of Maine.58 
B. Offshore Renewable Energy 
While the issues surrounding transboundary fisheries have a long and 
well-established history in the Gulf of Maine that is familiar to both 
Canada and the United States, offshore renewable energy is a new and 
emerging activity for both countries.  The attention given to renewable 
energy generation globally and in Canada and the United States is driven 
in large measure by three areas of concern, namely the growing 
recognition of the impacts of climate change on the earth’s systems, the 
rising costs of energy derived from conventional non-renewable sources, 
and the need for both countries to ensure energy security.59  While there 
is considerable debate over the sources of global warming, concern over 
its impacts has been increasing among policy makers, scientists, and the 
general public on a global scale.60  However, according to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment 
                                            
 56. Pudden & VanderZwaag, supra note 41, at 41. 
 57. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, 1984 I.C.J. 
246, 344 (Oct. 12). 
 58. Id. at 344. 
 59. See President Barack Obama, speech at COP 15 in Copenhagen, Denmark (Dec. 
18, 2009), available at http://www.copenhagenclimatecouncil.com/get-informed/ 
news/cop15-remarks-of-president-barack-obama.html. 
 60. Efforts to address climate change impacts at a law and policy level include Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 
1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005); The U.N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), May 9, 1982, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into 
force Mar. 24, 1994).  
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Report,61 global atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, 
and nitrous oxide have increased markedly as a result of human activities 
since 1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial values determined from ice 
cores spanning many thousands of years.  Furthermore, the report’s 
authors have identified carbon dioxide as the most important 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas and have attributed the global increases in 
carbon dioxide concentration primarily to fossil fuel use and land use 
change, while those of methane and nitrous oxide were attributed 
primarily to agriculture.62  
In light of the potential opportunities available for renewable sources 
of energy63 to address, to varying degrees, the three areas of concern 
mentioned above, increasing attention is being paid to the use of the 
ocean environment as a source of renewable energy by both Canada and 
the United States.  For example, in fiscal year 2008, the U.S. Department 
of the Interior’s Minerals Management Service (MMS) awarded seven 
new ocean environmental studies related to the Offshore Alternative 
Energy Program (worth $3.8 million) to evaluate several aspects relating 
to alternative energy.64  These studies were aimed at ensuring that the 
environmental consequences of alternative energy siting, operations, and 
interactions with other ocean resources are appropriately evaluated.65  
Furthermore, in April 2009, under the authority granted in the Energy 
Policy Act66 (2005), MMS finalized its Framework for Renewable 
Energy Production in the United States.67  In addition to establishing a 
process for granting leases, easements, and rights-of-way for offshore 
                                            
 61. Richard B. Alley et. al, Working Group 1 of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL 
SCIENCE BASIS (Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, 
M.Tignor and H.L. Miller eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United 
Kingdom, 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-
wg1-spm.pdf. 
 62. Id. at 2. 
 63. Alternative or renewable energy includes wind, solar, hydrokinetics (wave, 
current, and tidal), and ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC). 
 64. See U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service Fact Sheet on 
Environmental Studies Program, http://www.mms.gov/offshore/RenewableEnergy/ 
Studies.htm (last visited June 10, 2010). 
 65. Id.  
 66. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 granted the Interior Department’s Minerals 
Management Service (MMS) the authority to regulate renewable energy development on 
the OCS, but no action had previously been taken under that authority.  
 67. Renewable Energy and Alternate Uses of Existing Facilities on the Outer 
Continental Shelf, 30 CFR Parts 250, 285, 290, available at 
http://www.mms.gov/offshore/AlternativeEnergy/PDFs/AD30RenewableEnergy04-22-
09.pdf 
306 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
renewable energy development, the new program also established 
methods for sharing revenues generated from Outer Continental Shelf 
(OCS) renewable energy projects with adjacent coastal states.68 The 
finalization of the program required an agreement69 between the 
Department of the Interior and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) to clarify jurisdictional understandings with respect 
to renewable energy projects on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf.70  
Additionally, the framework will enhance partnerships with federal, 
state, and local agencies and tribal governments to assist in maximizing 
the economic and ecological benefits of OCS renewable energy 
development. 
At the state level, two New England states are working to address the 
larger coastal community planning issues posed by siting renewable 
energy projects in the ocean. Following the conclusions of the 
Massachusetts Ocean Management Task Force in 2004 calling for a 
comprehensive approach to coastal and ocean management, the 
legislature passed the Massachusetts Oceans Act in 2008.  The Act 
requires the Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs to develop a 
comprehensive ocean management plan, incorporating stakeholder input 
and utilizing an Ocean Advisory Commission which includes an expert 
in offshore renewable energy, and an Ocean Science Advisory Council.71  
                                            
 68. Note that the term “adjacent coastal States” refers to states within the United 
States, not nation-states.  This sharing of revenues in the Energy Policy Act raises an 
interesting question for cross-border countries such as Canada and the United States 
regarding the potential for shared revenues.  Currently, the Act requires payment to 
eligible states of twenty seven percent of the revenues from any projects located wholly 
or partially within the area extending between three and six miles from shore.  It also 
requires equitable distribution of shared revenue among coastal states that are within 
fifteen miles of the geographic center of the project.  Given the potential for projects to 
be within this geographic area of each other’s maritime boundary, would an agreement 
for revenue sharing between the two countries be reasonable? 
 69. U.S. Department of the Interior & Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S Department of the Interior and the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Apr. 9, 2009), available at http://www.mms. 
gov/offshore/AlternativeEnergy/PDFs/DOI_FERC_MOU.pdf. 
 70. Under the agreement, the MMS has exclusive jurisdiction with regard to the 
production, transportation, or transmission of energy from non-hydrokinetic renewable 
energy projects, including wind and solar.  FERC will have exclusive jurisdiction to issue 
licenses for the construction and operation of hydrokinetic projects, including wave and 
current, but companies will be required to first obtain a lease through MMS. 
 71. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS, MASSACHUSETTS 
OCEAN MANAGEMENT PLAN (December 31, 2009), available at http://www.env. 
state.ma.us/eea/mop/final-v1/v1-complete.pdf [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS OCEAN 
MANAGEMENT PLAN]. 
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The final plan was promulgated on December 31, 2009, and guides the 
siting of renewable energy projects in Massachusetts’ waters.72  Rhode 
Island has embarked on a similar comprehensive planning process to 
support a goal of obtaining fifteen percent (1.3 million MW-h-per year) 
of state energy requirements from wind energy resources by 2015.  The 
Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC), the 
state’s coastal zone management agency, is developing the Ocean 
Special Area Management Plan (Ocean SAMP) which will define use 
zones for Rhode Island’s offshore waters through a research and 
planning process that integrates the best available science with open 
public input and involvement.73  The Ocean SAMP will be completed by 
June 2010.  To prepare for the future development of an offshore wind 
farm, the Rhode Island Office of Energy Resources issued a request for 
proposals in 2008, selecting Deepwater Wind in October 2008.  Once the 
Ocean SAMP is adopted by CRMC and subsequently by NOAA, the 
permitting and review process will commence with the selected 
developer.74  In addition, although not as comprehensive a planning 
exercise as undertaken by Massachusetts and Rhode Island, a number of 
other states have begun the process of developing a regulatory 
framework specifically for offshore wind projects.  This is mainly 
because, as noted in the report to the Governor of Michigan by the 
Michigan Great Lakes Wind Council (September 2009),  
A process for approving or denying offshore use of the 
Michigan’s Great Lakes bottomlands for wind energy does not 
currently exist. If an application were received today, the state’s 
review process would prove inadequate and would likely lead to 
confusion within government agencies as well as for the 
applicant and the public.75 
Although only two offshore wind energy projects have formally been 
proposed in the U.S. Northeast region, at least twenty other separate 
projects may be proposed in the near future.76  The most prominent 
                                            
 72. Id.  
 73. See generally Rhode Island Ocean Special Area Management Plan, 
http://seagrant.gso.uri.edu/oceansamp/ (last visited June 10, 2010). 
 74. See Background Document of Marine Renewable Energy Projects, at 5, Marine 
Law Symposium, Roger Williams University School of Law, Oct. 23-24, 2008.  
 75. MICHIGAN GREAT LAKES WIND COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN GREAT LAKES 
WIND COUNCIL 4 (2009), available at http://www.michiganglowcouncil.org/ 
GLOW%20Report%209-1-09_FINAL.pdf. 
 76. Pudden & VanderZwaag, supra note 41, at 42. 
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project77 is that of Cape Wind Associates (CWA), which proposes to 
construct a wind farm on Horseshoe Shoal, located between Cape Cod 
and Nantucket, in Nantucket Sound, Massachusetts.78  The CWA project 
would have 130 wind turbines located as close as 4.1 miles offshore of 
Cape Cod in an area of approximately twenty four square miles with the 
turbines being placed at a minimum of one-third-miles apart.79  The 
turbines will be connected by cables, which will relay the energy to shore 
and the power grid.  If constructed, the turbines would preempt other 
bottom uses in an area, similar to oil and natural gas leases.  The 
potential impacts associated with the CWA offshore wind energy project 
include the construction, operation, and removal of turbine platforms and 
transmission cables; thermal and vibration impacts; and changes to 
species assemblages within the area from the introduction of vertical 
structures.80 
In Canada, there has not been a comparable level of federal activity 
as in the United States and there is currently only one offshore marine 
renewable energy project in the developmental stage on Canada’s East 
coast.81  Unlike the focus taken in the U.S. Northeast, efforts to advance 
offshore renewable energy in the Canadian Maritime provinces are 
focused on hydrokinetic technologies rather than wind, although there is 
growing attention for onshore wind generation in each of the three 
provinces.  At the provincial level, the government of Nova Scotia 
                                            
 77. A second project is proposed by the Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) off 
Long Island, New York.  See Rusty Russell, Neither Out Far Nor In Deep: The Prospects 
for Utility-Scale Wind Power in the Coastal Zone, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 221, n.31 
(2004).  
 78. See Michael Schultz, Questions Blowing in the Wind: The Development of 
Offshore Wind as a Renewable Source of Energy in the United States, 38 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 415, 421-422 (2004). 
 79. See id. at 422. 
 80. See U.S. Department of the Interior, DOI News, Secretary Salazar Announces 
Approval of Cape Wind Energy Project on Outer Continental Shelf of Massachusetts, 
Apr. 28, 2010, http://www.doi.gov/news/doinews/Secretary-Salazar-Announces-
Approval-of-Cape-Wind-Energy-Project-on-Outer-Continental-Shelf-off-
Massachusetts.cfm. 
 81. In Canada, Nova Scotia is currently examining the policy and legal framework for 
exploiting in-stream tidal energy from the Bay of Fundy.  See Government of Nova 
Scotia, Government Home, Energy, Renewables, Public Education, Tidal, Nova Scotia 
Renewables Public Education in Tidal Energy http://www.gov.ns.ca/energy/ 
renewables/public-education/tidal.asp (last visited June 10, 2010); GEORGE HAGERMAN & 
ROGER BEDARD, EPRI, NOVA SCOTIA TIDAL IN-STREAM ENERGY CONVERSION (TISEC): 
SURVEY AND CHARACTERIZATION OF POTENTIAL PROJECT SITES (Oct. 2, 2006), available 
at http://oceanenergy.epri.com/attachments/streamenergy/ reports/Tidal_003_ME_Site_ 
Survey_Report_REV_1.pdf. 
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required that a Strategic Environmental Assessment be conducted on 
Fundy Tidal Energy to provide guidance on exploitation and the potential 
impacts of renewable ocean energy.82  Somewhat consistent with the 
broader, integrated planning efforts undertaken by Massachusetts and 
Rhode Island, Recommendation 25 from the OEER Technical Advisory 
Group to the Nova Scotia Department of Energy called for the Province 
of Nova Scotia to develop an Integrated Coastal Zone Management 
Policy for the Bay of Fundy before large scale commercial marine 
renewable energy developments are allowed to proceed.  The province 
should involve communities and stakeholders in the development of the 
policy and should undertake to resource that involvement.83  
Interestingly, Recommendation 2984 from the same report called for a 
major inter-jurisdictional workshop in 2009 involving Nova Scotia and 
New Brunswick, Canada, and Maine to examine integrated management 
issues and organization options for the Bay of Fundy.85 
Despite lessons learned in international law over principles guiding 
the exploitation of transboundary offshore non-renewable energy 
resources and the development of cooperative agreements between states 
driven by oil and gas resources,86 very little attention is currently being 
paid in anticipation of the bilateral jurisdictional issues surrounding 
offshore renewable energy.  According to a recent estimate from NOAA, 
approximately thirty-eight renewable energy projects in the U.S. 
Northeast are currently in various stages of approval from MMS and 
FERC and, among these, it would appear that approximately eight are 
within some proximity to the Hague Line.87  As with cross-border 
nonrenewable resources, it seems reasonable to expect that countries 
would look to UNCLOS as one of the key drivers in providing guidance 
related to the development of international law affecting renewable 
                                            
 82. OEER TECHNICAL ADVISORY GROUP, FUNDY TIDAL ENERGY STRATEGIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FINAL REPORT (Apr. 2008), available at 
https://www.oreg.ca/docs/Fundy_SEA.pdf 
 83. Id.at 71. 
 84. Id. at 83. 
 85. The authors are not aware that this activity has occurred. 
 86. For a discussion on the subject of emerging international environmental law and 
policy with respect to the rules of engagement for cross border oil and gas development, 
see Peter D. Cameron, The Rules of Engagement: Developing Cross-Border Petroleum 
Deposits in the North Sea and the Caribbean, 55 ICLQ 559 (2006). 
 87. Lopez, Marine Renewable Energy: Growing Demands on NOAA and Our Oceans, 
Marine Law Symposium Roger Williams University School of Law, Oct. 24, 2008, 
available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ habitat/habitatprotection/oceanrenewableenergy/ 
documents/Comments_and_Presentations/Presentations/RWmarinelawsymposium_oct20
08.pdf.  
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energy resources.88  Two key articles of the Convention that would be 
applicable are those pertaining to the sovereign right of the state for 
purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving, and managing natural 
resources,89 and a coastal state’s sovereign rights to explore the seabed 
and exploit its natural resources.90  At the same time, it has been debated 
whether it is “unlawful” for a sovereign state to unilaterally exploit a 
common petroleum resource or whether the international legal regime is 
simply providing “rules of engagement” for cooperation.91  Scholars have 
also drawn attention to Article 142 of the Convention, where resource 
deposits straddle maritime boundaries.  Accordingly, prior notification 
to, and prior consent of, the coastal state is required when exploitation in 
a given area may result in exploitation of resources lying within national 
jurisdiction.92   
Given this level of complexity and legal uncertainty surrounding a 
“fixed” resource such as a petroleum deposit, it is difficult to predict how 
the legal regime regarding dynamic renewable resources in a cross-
border situation might unfold.  It may very likely be that, rather than 
looking for guidance from examples of nonrenewable resource decisions, 
more relevant insights might be obtained from decisions and agreements 
relating to how a coastal state manages its migratory living marine 
resources, nested within the evolving practice of integrated management 
and the application of an ecosystem-based approach.  
IV. OCEAN PLANNING TRENDS IN THE U.S. AND CANADA 
As with most coastal nations, sectoral ocean uses in the United States 
and Canada developed in isolation from each other, with different needs 
and technologies, separate networks, communications, and practices.93  
This has resulted in autonomous sectors, having minimal or no links 
between them.94  Such a fragmentary approach may have been adequate 
                                            
 88. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 234, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
 89. Id. art. 56(1)(a). 
 90. Id. art. 77(1) & (2). 
 91. Cameron, supra note 86, at 561. 
 92. Id. at 567. 
 93. Scott Coffen-Smout, Final Report of the Canadian Ocean Assessment: A Review 
of Canadian Ocean Policy and Practice (1996); Lawrence Juda, Changing National 
Approaches to Ocean Governance: The United States, Canada, and Australia, 34 
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 161 (2003) 
 94. For example, to manage its coastal and ocean activities, twenty-nine federal 
departments and agencies have direct oceans-related programs with a suite of associated 
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early in the twentieth century.  However, it has proven to be highly 
dysfunctional in the last quarter, an era of rapid technological change, 
many ocean uses and an increasing display of multiple-use conflicts, 
particularly in the resource-rich waters overlying the continental shelf.  
Additional factors further complicating efforts at ocean governance have 
been identified as the fluid, three-dimensional nature of the medium; the 
complexity of the interactive ecosystems; mobility and opacity of 
resources and activities; and the mismatch between administrative 
boundaries and jurisdictional authorities and the natural environment.95 
To address the sectoral shortcoming to ocean-related policy 
formulation, the past two decades have seen an increasing call for coastal 
states to adopt an integrated approach to policy, program, and planning 
development.96  For the United States and Canada, efforts to respond 
institutionally and legislatively to a practice that would support a more 
holistic approach to management have been positive, albeit slow.97  
Reviews by both American and Canadian scholars have highlighted the 
progress made by the countries as each attempted to shift from a single 
sector, “silo” approach to one that is more reflective of 
interconnectivities between the multiple users and uses of the coastal and 
ocean environments.98  Strategies adopted for implementing integrated 
                                                                                                  
laws and statutes.  Government of Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, The Role of the 
Canadian Government in the Ocean Sector (2009), available at http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/oceans/publications/cg-gc/index-eng.htm. At the provincial and territorial 
level, some seventy-six departments and agencies, with authority under approximately 
200 pieces of legislation, exercise some role with respect to ocean-related programs and 
activities.  Government of Canada, The Role of the Provinces and Territories in the 
Ocean Sector (2009), available at http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/publications/pg-
gp/index-eng.htm. 
 95. Alastair Couper, History of Ocean Management, in OCEAN MGMT. IN GLOBAL 
CHANGE 1 (Paolo Fabri ed., 1992). 
 96. See e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-
14, 1992, Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
 97. Betsy Baker, Filling an Arctic Gap: Legal and Regulatory Possibilities for 
Canadian-U.S. Cooperation in the Beaufort Sea, 34 VT. L. REV. 57 (2009).  
 98. See id.; Aldo Chircop & Larry Hildebrand, Beyond the Buzzwords: A Perspective 
on Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management in Canada, in TOWARDS PRINCIPLED 
OCEANS GOVERNANCE 19 (Donald Rothwell & David VanderZwaag eds., 2006); Lucia 
Fanning, Towards an Understanding of the Role of Core Values and Policy Networks to 
Influence Decision-Making in an Evolving Ocean Governance Era: A Maritimes Canada 
Study (2003) (unpublished PhD Thesis, on file with Dalhousie University); Juda, supra 
note 93; C.L. Mitchell, Sustainable Oceans Development: the Canadian Approach, 22 
MARINE POLICY 393 (1998); Robert O’Boyle & Glen Jamieson, Observations on the 
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management and an ecosystem-based approach have also varied between 
the two countries, with the United States focusing initially on developing 
a federal Coastal Zone Management Act99 in 1972 and Canada following 
some twenty-five years later with enabling legislation for the oceans with 
the passage of its Oceans Act.100  Nonetheless, while following different 
paths, it seems that there is evidence to support the hope that each 
country has now committed to “adapt its practice to the science that has 
consistently shown that ecosystem-based, as opposed to sectoral, oceans 
management is the route to healthier and more productive oceans.”101 
A. Canada’s Ocean Management Regime 
Canada’s Ocean Act and its subsequently developed Ocean 
Strategy102 and Ocean Action Plan103 reflect the underlying principles, 
current approach, and priorities that Canada intends to apply with respect 
to managing its coastal and ocean activities.  
The need to increase policy coordination and coherence horizontally 
amongst responsible government agencies and vertically amongst 
responsible jurisdictions has been recognized in Canada’s Oceans Act.104  
This legislation, inter alia¸ brought Canadian law in line with 
internationally agreed-upon jurisdiction for the oceans, increased the 
authority of the Ministry of Fisheries and Oceans to deal with oceans 
management, and introduced a new mechanism, known as ‘integrated 
management,’ to Canadian oceans management.  Part I of the Act 
comprehensively states Canada’s position to assume its rights and 
responsibilities over maritime zones, as granted to coastal states under 
UNCLOS.105  Sections 4 through 19 assert Canada’s claims over its 
maritime zones, consistent with customary international law and 
UNCLOS, even though Canada had not at the time ratified the 
                                                                                                  
Implementation of Ecosystem-Based Management: Experiences on Canada’s East and 
West Coasts 79 FISHERIES RESEARCH 1 (2006). 
 99. Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-56 (1972). 
 100. Oceans Act, 1996 S.C., c. 31. 
 101. Baker, supra note 97, at 82. 
 102. FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANADA, CANADA’S OCEANS STRATEGY: OUR OCEANS, 
OUR FUTURE: POLICY AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT OF 
THE ESTUARINE, COASTAL AND MARINE ENVIRONMENTS IN CANADA (2002), www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/oceans/publications/cos-soc/pdf/cos-soc-eng.pdf. 
 103. FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANADA, CANADA’S OCEANS ACTION PLAN: FOR PRESENT 
AND FUTURE GENERATIONS (2005), www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/canwaters-eauxcan/oap-pao/pdf/ 
oap_e.pdf. 
 104. Oceans Act, 1996 S.C., c. 31. 
 105. Id. part 1.  
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Convention.  This Part of the Act also asserts the rights of Canada over 
the seabed and subsoil in internal waters,106 the territorial sea,107 the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),108 and the continental shelf,109 in 
accordance with the Act and international law.  
Part II of the Act allows for the development and implementation of 
a national oceans strategy for the management of estuarine, coastal, and 
marine ecosystems in Canadian waters.110  The principles of sustainable 
development, integrated management, and the precautionary approach to 
be used in guiding the development of the strategy are articulated.  The 
legal responsibility for leading and facilitating its development and 
implementation is assigned to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, in 
collaboration with a suite of listed agencies and bodies.  Included in Part 
II are the basic authorities and tools to be used to define the parameters 
of the oceans strategy.  These include: the establishment of marine 
protected areas;111 the establishment and enforcement of marine 
environmental quality guidelines, criteria, and standards for the purposes 
of implementing integrated management plans;112 and the development 
and implementation of integrated management plans.113  However, 
Section 31 the Act limits Ministerial implementation of the integrated 
management plans within those areas assigned by law to DFO.114  This 
Part of the Act also allows for the creation or recognition of advisory 
bodies115 and ends with a restatement of provisions for enforcement and 
penalties that are included in the criminal code.116 
Part III of the Act names the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans as the 
lead federal authority responsible for oceans.117  The powers, duties, and 
functions of this role are detailed, including new responsibilities for the 
coast guard,118 the provision of hydrographic services,119 as well as 
                                            
 106. Id. part 1, §6. 
 107. Id. part 1, §4. 
 108. Id. part 1, §13. 
 109. Id. part 1, §17. 
 110. Id. part 2. 
 111. Id. part 2, §35. 
 112. Id. part 2, §31. 
 113. Id. part 2, §32 
 114. Id. part 2, §31.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. part 2, §37. 
 117. Id. part 3, §37. 
 118. Id. part 3, §41 
 119. Id. part 3, §45  
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marine scientific advice supporting ocean management 
responsibilities.120  
The Oceans Act has the potential to restructure, consolidate and 
create a holistic approach to oceans management which could provide a 
mechanism for balancing the many competing ocean interests.  However, 
it has been criticized for not living up to expectations, primarily by 
Canadian scholars.121  The academic literature focuses on two particular 
elements of the Act: “fragmentation” and “integrated management,” and 
it faults the Act for failing to reduce fragmentation in oceans 
management and failing to define many of the terms crucial to 
implementing integrated management.122 
An attempt to address these shortcomings is evident in Canada’s 
Ocean Strategy (the Strategy), released almost six years after being 
legislated for in Part II of the Oceans Act.  The goal of the Strategy is “to 
ensure healthy, safe and prosperous oceans for the benefit of current and 
future generations of Canadians.”123  The Strategy sets out the policy 
direction for ocean management in Canada and focuses on policies and 
programs aimed at understanding and protecting the marine environment; 
supporting sustainable economic opportunities; and providing 
international leadership.124  
The commitment to work collaboratively with all levels of 
government and to adopt a participatory principle with regards to 
engaging Canadians in meeting the objectives of the Strategy is 
declared.125  The framework envisions this being accomplished with a 
specific geographic focus—through collaboration among governmental 
and non-governmental representatives with interests in a given area of 
ocean space, either offshore (large ocean management areas) or in areas 
designated as coastal management areas.  Mechanisms to solicit 
                                            
 120. Id. part 3, §42. 
 121. Aldo Chircop, Hugh Kindred, Phillip Saunders & David VanderZwaag, 
Legislating for Integrated Marine Management: Canada’s proposed Oceans Act of 1996, 
33 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INT’L L. 305 (1995); Aldo Chircop and Bruce Marchand, 
Oceans Act: Uncharted Seas for Offshore Development in Atlantic Canada? 24 
DALHOUSIE L.J. 23 (2001); Chircop & Hildebrand, supra note 98; Sylvie Guénette & 
Jackie Alder, Lessons from Marine Protected Areas and Integrated Oceans Management 
Initiatives in Canada, 35 COASTAL MGMT. 51 (2007); John Kearney, et al., The Role of 
Participatory Governance and Community-Based Management in Integrated Coastal and 
Ocean Management in Canada, 35 COASTAL MGMT. 79 (2007).  
 122. McCrimmon & Lucia Fanning, Critiquing Canada’s Ocean Act: A Review of the 
1995-2008 Academic Literature, (forthcoming). 
 123. Supra note 102, at 10. 
 124. Id. at 12. 
 125. Id. at 18. 
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stakeholder input and improve coordination in ocean management 
include the establishment of new and existing committees, management 
boards, and other forms of information sharing.  Secondly, the Strategy 
identifies integrated management as the cornerstone of Canadian ocean 
governance and notes the explicit link between conservation and 
protection of ecosystems, while at the same time providing opportunities 
for creating wealth in oceans-related economies and communities.126  It 
also highlights the adoption of sustainable development explicitly, with 
its reference to bringing together “the environmental, economic and 
social considerations by planning for sustainable use of the oceans in a 
safe and secure environment.”127  Finally, the Strategy recognizes the 
need to engage Canadians in promoting stewardship and awareness of 
the oceans for present and future generations. 
Critiques of the Strategy have focused on the general nature of the 
policy, recognizing that as a national policy, specificities would have to 
be addressed in the more detailed integrated management plans.128  While 
adopting an ecosystem approach, it was noted that the boundaries of the 
proposed large ocean management areas appeared to be more 
administratively and jurisdictionally based than functional or ecosystem-
based.129  Efforts at integrated management and collaborative processes 
were viewed as a plus.  However, a gap was noted in the need to clarify 
the accountability structure in the event of problems arising as a result of 
actions undertaken by these collaborative mechanisms, consisting of 
government and non-government actors.130  The Strategy was also 
criticized for lacking the appropriate evaluation mechanism to fully 
capture the lessons learned from its “learning by doing” adaptive 
approach.131  
Complementary to the Strategy, Canada’s Ocean Action Plan, 
released in May 2005, outlined the priorities for action and allocated 
some twenty-eight million dollars to implement these activities over a 
two-year period.  Four main areas of focus were outlined for action.  The 
first activity addressed “International Leadership, Sovereignty and 
Security,” in which efforts to work collaboratively with the United States 
in the Gulf of Maine to address transboundary fisheries management and 
improve environmental protection emergency response were identified. 
                                            
 126. Id. at 19. 
 127. Id. at v.  
 128. Chircop & Hildebrand, supra note 98.   
 129. Id. at 28. 
 130. Id. at 34. 
 131. Id. 
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The second activity focused on implementing “Integrated Management” 
planning for five large ocean management areas, including continuing 
the efforts to develop an Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management 
Plan.  The third activity centered on “Health of the Oceans” and the 
development of a Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy and greater 
enforcement activity on Canada’s east coast to better identify and 
investigate marine pollution from ships transiting Canadian waters.  The 
fourth area of emphasis addressed “Science and Technology” with the 
development of an Ocean Technology Network.  
Current efforts to advance integrated management on the Maritimes 
Region of Canada have focused on the adoption of marine spatial 
planning (MSP) and the legislative framework needed to facilitate MSP 
implementation.132  The slow pace of implementation of an Integrated 
Management approach has led to suggestions for policy renewal, 
program review, and critical analysis.  The potential ability of MSP to 
meet the intent of the Oceans Act and the expectations of the engaged 
public citizenry that has participated in the development process of 
integrated management to date was considered significant, particularly in 
light of the lessons being learned internationally.  
Based on a preliminary analysis,133 it would appear that Canada has 
at least three options for creating a functional MSP regime: (i) amending 
the Oceans Act, (ii) reinterpreting the Oceans Act; and (iii) using a 
Federal Cabinet Directive.  However, any of these methods would 
require significant political consensus, as will the long-term application 
of any marine spatial plan.  An MSP regime established by the Canadian 
federal government will also have to address its inability to manage the 
governing competencies granted to the provinces by the Constitution 
Act.134  This can be done through the creation of Memorandums of 
Understanding (MOUs) with the provinces but, given the jurisdictional 
complexity in Canada, their necessity may make marine spatial plans in 
some regions impractical.  For example, while in theory the Gulf of St. 
                                            
 132. In conjunction with the Marine Affairs Program, Dalhousie University, DFO 
Maritimes and Gulf regions, held a Learning Session on November 25, 2009 in 
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia entitled “Why Consider Marine Spatial Planning (MSP)? Does 
MSP provide an implementation mechanism for an integrated approach to coastal and 
oceans management and planning in a regional Atlantic Canadian context?” The intent of 
the learning session was to consider the suitability of MSP as a tool and process to 
advance the implementation of integrated approaches to coastal and oceans management 
in Canada. 
 133. McCrimmon & Lucia Fanning, Marine Spatial Planning: International Lessons 
for Canadian Development (forthcoming). 
 134. Constitution Act, 1982, c. 3 U.K.. 
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Lawrence would be an ideal location for MSP based on its ecology and 
high usage, the need to coordinate management between multiple 
federal, provincial, municipal, and aboriginal governments and 
government agencies make successful MSP in the region unlikely.  On 
the other hand, areas like the Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated 
Management (ESSIM) area and the Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of Maine 
are likely better candidates for successful marine spatial plans in Canada.  
B. U.S. Ocean Planning 
Pursuant to the Oceans Act of 2000, the United States established a 
sixteen-member Commission on Ocean Policy (the Commission) “to 
make recommendations for coordinated and comprehensive national 
ocean policy.”135  The Commission issued its final report—”An Ocean 
Blueprint for the 21st Century”—in September 2004.136  The report 
contained over 200 recommendations for U.S. ocean and coastal 
policy.137  In response to some of these recommendations, President 
George W. Bush established a Committee on Ocean Policy138 as part of 
the Council on Environmental Quality, a coordinating body within the 
Executive Office of the President.139  Shortly thereafter, the Commission 
expired under the terms of the Ocean Act of 2000.140  
In the meantime, the national interest in marine renewable energies 
blossomed.  A proposal to establish the first U.S. off-shore wind farm off 
the coast of Massachusetts grabbed the nation’s attention and forced 
Massachusetts to examine its coastal and marine priorities.  Indeed, as 
explained above, the state passed its own Oceans Act in 2008, calling for 
a comprehensive ocean management plan.  As required, the Executive 
                                            
 135. Oceans Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-256, 114 Stat. 644 (2000) (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 857-19 (2001)). 
 136. U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century 
(2004), available at http://oceancommission.gov/documents/full_color_rpt/welcome.html 
(last visited June 10, 2010). 
 137. Id.  
 138. See id.  
 139. The Council on Environmental Quality was established pursuant to the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969.  National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
4321 (1969).  See also The White House, Home, The Administration, Council on 
Environmental Quality, The Council on Environmental Quality-About, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ administration/eop/ceq/about (last visited June 10, 2010). 
 140. See 33 U.S.C. § 857-19(Sec. 3)(f)(2)(i) (“The Commission shall cease to exist 90 
days after the date on which it submits its final report.”). 
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Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs delivered a final 
Massachusetts Ocean Management Plan on December 31, 2009.141 
Rhode Island also undertook marine spatial planning in response to 
off-shore wind development opportunities.  Led by the Rhode Island 
Coastal Resources Management Council, a project is underway to create 
an ocean Special Area Management Plan (SAMP) to designate specific 
use zones of Rhode Island’s state waters.142  
Incentives to develop marine renewable energy have also arisen in 
recent years.  The federal government has offered financial incentives to 
investment firms who invest in marine renewable technologies while also 
issuing grants and loans directly to renewable energy developers under 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and the Omnibus 
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2009.143  In addition, project approval 
delays and regulatory uncertainty caused by jurisdictional battles 
between the MMS and FERC were reduced by their recent MOU.144  
Following this agreement, MMS was able to “establish a new regulatory 
regime for wind, wave, current, solar and other emerging technologies” 
on the Outer Continental Shelf.145 
President Barack Obama’s administration not only announced 
significant national interest in developing marine renewable energy, it 
also recognized the growing competition for use of marine environments 
and the need for ocean use planning.  Accordingly, in June 2009 
President Obama established the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force 
(the Task Force).146  The Task Force is led by the White House Council 
                                            
 141. MASSACHUSETTS OCEAN MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 71. 
 142. See Rhode Island Ocean Special Area Management Plan, About Us, 
http://seagrant.gso.uri.edu/ oceansamp/about.html (last visited June 10, 2010). 
 143. Peter J. Schaumburg and Ami M. Grace-Tardy, The Dawn of Federal Marine 
Renewable Energy Development, 24 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 15, 16 (2010). 
 144. Id. (citing U.S. Department of the Interior & FERC, Memorandum of 
Understanding Between the U.S. Department of the Interior and the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (Apr. 9, 2009), available at www.mms.gov/offshore/ 
AlternativeEnergy/PDFs/DOI_FERC_MOU.pdf). Prior to the MOU, each agency 
believed it had authority over renewable energy projects on the Outer Continental Shelf 
pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which amended the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56(a) (2005).  Id. 
 145. Id.  
 146. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Memorandum for the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies (June 12, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ page/files/2009ocean_ mem_rel.pdf.  
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on Environmental Quality.147  Its charge includes “developing a 
recommendation for a national policy that ensures protection, 
maintenance, and restoration of oceans, our coasts and the Great Lakes” 
and recommending “a framework for improved stewardship, and 
effective coastal and marine spatial planning.”148  
The Task Force issued its interim report on September 10, 2009.  In 
preparing the report, the Task Force consulted the report prepared by the 
U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy.149  The Task Force gently suggested 
that the Committee on Ocean Policy established following that report 
was only “moderately effective” in bringing federal agencies together to 
coordinate national ocean policy, and that there was much room for 
improvement in setting a strong overarching policy for national ocean 
priorities; getting high-level direction and policy guidance from a “clear 
and identifiable authority;” and creating enhanced “ongoing and active 
engagement with state, tribal, and local authorities, and regional 
governance structures” among other things.150 
To facilitate implementation of the numerous proposed ocean policy 
goals, the Task Force called for creation of a National Ocean Council 
(NOC).151  This body would consist of both principal-level administrators 
and deputy-level administrators,152 presumably to ensure appropriate 
decision-making authority while also carrying out the decisions through 
                                            
 147. See The White House, Council on Environmental Quality, The Interagency Ocean 
Policy Task Force, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/oceans 
(last visited June 10, 2010).  
 148. Id.  
 149. THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, INTERIM REPORT OF 
THE INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE 3 (Sept. 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/09_17_09_Interim_Report_of_Task_Force
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 150. Id. at 6. 
 151. Id. at 18. 
 152. Id. (“Members of the NOC would include: the Secretaries of State, Defense, the 
Interior, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Commerce, Labor, Transportation, 
Energy and Homeland Security; the Attorney General; the Administrator of the 
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time designate.”). 
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action.  The NOC would be responsible for advising the President on the 
“National Policy for the Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts and the 
Great Lakes,” and would also have overall responsibility for 
implementing the National Policy.153  To carry out its functions, the NOC 
would be comprised of a steering committee, an Ocean Resource 
Management Interagency Policy Committee, an Ocean Science and 
Technology Interagency Policy Committee, and a Governance Advisory 
Committee.154  The latter would consist of members representing states, 
tribes, and regional governance structures, and would “provide input to 
the NOC on issues of inter-jurisdictional collaboration and cooperation 
on the National Policy and related matters.”155  
One of the nine priority objectives listed in the Task Force’s Interim 
Report is coastal and marine spatial planning (CMSP).156  Accordingly, 
on December 9, 2009, the Task Force issued another report titled 
“Interim Framework for Effective Coastal and Marine Spatial 
Planning.”157  The report notes that most federal permitting processes for 
myriad ocean uses “focus solely on a limited range of management tools 
and outcomes” rather than incorporating a “more integrated, 
comprehensive, ecosystem-based, flexible, and proactive approach to 
planning and managing these uses and activities.”158  The proposed 
framework for CMSP “is intended to yield substantial economic, 
ecological, and social benefits” by incorporating “principles of sound 
science for ecosystem-based and adaptive management,” and by being 
“transparent” and “informed by stakeholders and the public.”159 
The report notes that many of the federal administrative agencies 
responsible for planning with respect to the ocean, coasts, and Great 
Lakes are already authorized by their enabling legislation to implement 
CMSP “consistent with and under the authority of these statutes.”160  The 
framework is simply in place to “provide all agencies with agreed upon 
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 154. Id. at 22, 23, 24. 
 155. Id. at 24. 
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 157. WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, INTERAGENCY OCEAN 
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principles and goals to guide their actions under their authorities, and to 
develop mechanisms so that federal, state, tribal, and local authorities, 
and regional governance structures, can proactively and cooperatively 
work together to exercise their respective authorities.”161  If, however, 
any agency identifies a procedural or substantive legal constraint 
preventing full cooperation with the CMSP guidelines, the NOC would 
work with the agency to evaluate whether legislative or regulatory 
changes are necessary and appropriate.162  
Among the several guiding principles for CMSP, necessary to 
achieve the nation’s goals, are that CMSP Plans would be: informed by 
“the best available science-based information, including the natural and 
social sciences;” guided by the precautionary approach as set forth in the 
Rio Declaration;163 and “implemented in accordance with customary 
international law, including as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention, and with treaties and other international agreements to 
which the United States is a party.”164 
The geographic scope of the CMSP planning area in the United 
States would include the territorial sea, EEZ, and the Continental Shelf, 
and would “extend landward to the mean high-water line.”165  In the 
Great Lakes region, the geographic scope of the planning area extends 
from the ordinary high-water mark to the limit of the U.S.-Canada 
international boundary.166  Excluded are the submerged lands underlying 
the Great Lakes, which, on the U.S. side, are “entirely under the 
jurisdiction and ownership of the Great Lakes States.”167  No specific 
mention is made of the Gulf of Maine region or any other geographical 
region shared with Canada or Mexico. 
To implement CMSP, the report calls for the United States to be 
subdivided into nine regional planning areas.  The areas would be based 
on the large marine ecosystem (LME) scale, “defined on the basis of 
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consistent ecological conditions.”168  Modifications to the nine regional 
planning areas would be made to accommodate existing state or regional 
ocean governance bodies.  The nine areas would include the Great Lakes, 
the Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic, Northeast, Gulf Coast, and West Coast, 
as well as Alaska, the Pacific Islands, and the Caribbean.169  The report 
calls on the NOC to facilitate regional CMS Plans for each of the nine 
areas.170  Regional planning bodies would be created with membership 
representing federal, state, and tribal interests “and indigenous 
community representatives with jurisdictional responsibilities or other 
interests (e.g., resource management, science, homeland and national 
security, transportation and public health) relevant to CMSP for that 
region.”171  The report calls for “ex officio” membership by adjacent 
coastal states to encourage consistent planning among regions.172  Key to 
the subject of this Article, moreover, the report acknowledges that the 
United States shares maritime boundaries with Mexico and Canada and 
suggests that the regional planning bodies “may include ex officio 
representation or observers from those nations.”173 
In creating the regional CMSP plans, the regional bodies are to 
identify regional objectives and build upon existing planning efforts 
(such as, for example, the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative Action Plan, 
and the ocean plans prepared by Massachusetts and Rhode Island).174  
Efforts made by adjacent coastal nations to plan adjoining waters would 
be appropriately considered, therefore, in the regional planning efforts of 
the relevant U.S. regions. This means Canada’s Eastern Scotian Shelf 
Integrated Management plan should be among the plans considered by 
the U.S. Northeast Region in preparing a CMSP for the Gulf of Maine 
area. 
IV. EXAMPLES OF BI-NATIONAL COOPERATION WITH REGARD TO 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER BODIES 
There are numerous examples of U.S.-Canada collaborative 
mechanisms, and a more recent count by the Gulf of Maine Council on 
the Marine Environment has identified some fifty binding and non-
binding agreements that the two countries have entered into to manage 
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cross-border issues.175  Not surprising, the overwhelming number of 
these agreements are non-binding, with only eight having a mandatory 
obligation on the parties to comply with the terms and conditions 
identified therein.176  The need and importance of these agreements to 
U.S.-Canada relations has been highlighted by numerous observers177 and 
most recently, the Policy Research Initiative (PRI) of the Government of 
Canada has joined with several other federal departments and outside 
experts and stakeholders to examine the growing significance, scope, and 
nature of cross-border regional relationships, and to explore their 
importance for the Government of Canada.  In the November 2008 Final 
Report, the Director General of PRI stated: 
Clearly, a turning point has been reached, where the 
management of Canada-U.S. relations is evolving into something 
much more dynamic and sophisticated—involving not only the 
Canadian and U.S. federal governments, but the provinces and 
states, private businesses and civil organizations as well, in a 
plethora of informal and formal relationships and networks all 
concerned with the practical problem-solving of common 
challenges and issues in the border regions of Canada and the 
United States.  More than anything, this growing involvement of 
players reflects a maturing of the Canada-U.S. relationship, and 
nowhere is this more evident than in the borderland regions, 
where cross-border regional relationships are flourishing.178 
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To provide an understanding of the significance of these agreements 
to the well-being of Canada-U.S. relations, the shared ecosystems and 
the people who depend on them, this section will highlight two such 
agreements.  The first of these is the binding and long established Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement and the second is the non-binding and 
much more recent Joint Statement of Cooperation on the Georgia Basin 
and Puget Sound Ecosystem.179 
A. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA or the 
Agreement) was first entered in 1972.180  It was a product of the 
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909—the foundation of U.S.-Canada 
transboundary water management.181  The Boundary Water Treaty 
provides for joint management between the countries of their shared 
waterways, performed under the authority of the International Joint 
Commission, a body with investigative and adjudicative authority whose 
six politically-appointed members equally represent both nations.182  
When, after World War II, scientists and others grew increasingly 
alarmed at the poor water quality of the Great Lakes and their ongoing 
degradation, the two nations knew something must be done.  The 
GLWQA was born out of concern over “grave deterioration of water 
quality on each side of the boundary to an extent that is causing injury to 
health and property on the other side.”183  The GLWQA set water quality 
objectives and created programs to achieve them.184  It further defined the 
functions of the International Joint Commission, transforming it into an 
“environmental protection institution.”185  Under the Agreement, the IJC 
is responsible for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating data from both 
nations regarding water quality of the boundary waters, and advising the 
authorities of both nations with regard to carrying out the terms of the 
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Agreement.186  Thus, while the IJC is actively involved in overseeing the 
GLWQA and helping to achieve its primary goals, the foremost 
responsibility for enforcing the agreement and, in particular, the water 
quality standards it contains, rests with the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency and Environment Canada.187   
The original GLWQA focused on phosphorous pollution, and while 
it had some success in reducing the impact of phosphorous discharge on 
the Great Lakes, scientific discoveries of other persistent organic 
chemicals degrading the water tempered the Agreement’s overall 
success.188  The Agreement was amended significantly in both 1978 and 
1987, striving to eliminate the impact of toxic chemicals on the Lakes 
and prevent new discharges of any additional toxic substances.189  
The GLWQA has been criticized for its “sub-treaty status” (since it 
was never approved by the U.S. Senate) and for lacking adequate 
enforcement provisions.190  It is not, for example, easy for adversely 
affected citizens to sue a responsible party for failure to enforce the 
Agreement.191  Nonetheless, the ICJ has made efforts to include citizens 
in its decision-making process. Following the ICJ’s twelfth biennial 
report, released in 2004, the ICJ undertook a major public comment 
period to determine how effective the CLWQA had been.192  The 
synthesis of comments from over 4000 sources is included in a report the 
ICJ issued in August 2006.193  The major recommendations of the report 
are that the Parties, among other things: 
• Enter into a replacement Agreement that is more “action-
oriented,” signed by the Canada’s Prime Minister and the 
President of the United States, and endorsed by the Canadian 
Parliament and the U.S. Congress. 
• Commit to creating a separate and enforceable bi-national 
Action Plan that “engages federal, state, provincial and 
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municipal departments and agencies, as well as Tribes and 
First Nations” and contains clear accountability provisions. 
• Establish a Steering Committee for the GLWQA comprised 
of heads of the Parties’ appropriate environmental protection 
and related agencies. 
• Provide “a more clear and meaningful role” for the IJC in 
implementing the Agreement.194 
This increased public participation, to some, compensates for the 
claim that GLWQA fails to contain adequate enforcement provisions.195  
The fact that the parties turn, at least occasionally, to their citizens for 
feedback creates accountability and political pressure to comply with the 
Agreement.   
As a model for the Gulf of Maine’s boundary waters, the GLWQA 
has much to recommend, in particular the strong role of the IJC and the 
representation by both parties on that commission.  In addition, the lead 
environmental agencies of both nations are responsible for protecting the 
boundary waters of the Great Lakes, placing responsibility on the highest 
administrative authorities with the greatest ability, in principle, to 
mandate compliance and conduct enforcement.  The GLWQA’s 
connection with the Boundary Waters Treaty elevates its status as a 
binational policy tool, but its lack of treaty status and endorsement by 
each nation’s legislative branch provides a lesson, for similar future 
agreements, in what to avoid.  Lastly, as is commonly understood in 
ocean planning and other resource management programs today, public 
participation and the inclusion of state, local, and tribal entities is also 
key to sound decision-making, community support, and accountability. 
B. Joint Statement of Cooperation on the Georgia Basin and Puget 
Sound Ecosystem 
The signing of the Statement of Cooperation by the Administrator of 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S.-EPA Region 10) and 
Canada’s Minister of Environment in January 2000, advocating a 
common framework for sustainability in the Georgia Basin and Puget 
Sound Ecosystem,196 resulted from an ongoing historical practice of 
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working collaboratively to address transboundary and global challenges 
confronting the shared ecosystem.  
The ecosystem, known by the area’s tribal and First Nations peoples 
as the Salish Sea, is comprised of the three basins of the Puget Sound, 
Strait of Juan de Fuca, and the Strait of Georgia on the Pacific coast of 
Canada and the United States.  Known as the Georgia Basin and Puget 
Sound Initiative, the area is considered one of the most ecologically 
diverse in North America, possessing internationally significant species 
and habitats.  With a population of some seven million inhabitants, 
pressures on the ecosystem include increasing population growth (at a 
rate that makes it one of the highest in North America), industrial 
expansion, and economic demands.  These have led to poor air quality, 
toxic contamination of marine and fresh water, loss or degradation of 
farmlands, wetlands, and wildlife habitat, and decline of culturally 
important species.197  
The Statement of Cooperation promotes closer U.S.-Canada 
collaboration in addressing challenges confronting the ecosystem and 
serves to: 
• publicly confirm the commitment by the two federal levels 
of government to transboundary collaboration for the health 
of the Georgia Basin -Puget Sound ecosystem;  
• recognize the special role and interests of Coast Salish 
Nations and Tribes;  
• acknowledge and support the excellent efforts in our region 
related to ecosystem management; and, 
• establish a formal Canada-U.S. commitment at the regional 
level to work cooperatively on the challenges identified In 
the Statement of Cooperation, including sustainability.198 
The Statement of Cooperation commits Environment Canada and the 
U.S. EPA to develop annual action plans and report to the public on 
progress.  The most recent Action Plan (2008-2010) focuses on 
transboundary collaboration, sharing knowledge and information, and 
transboundary demonstration projects contributing to improved air 
quality, water quality, and habitat and species health. While the 
administration and management of the agreement are the responsibility 
of the two federal agencies, a working group responsible for developing 
the action plans and reporting on progress is comprised of additional 
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members from the Coast Salish Gathering Secretariats (representing 
Nations and Tribes in the Georgia Basin-Puget Sound region), the British 
Columbia Ministry of the Environment, Washington State Department of 
Ecology, and the Puget Sound Partnerships.  
Triggers behind the establishment of formal ecosystem-wide 
agreements in the Georgia Basin-Puget Sound area have been identified 
to include the growing recognition amongst decision-makers, 
stakeholders, and residents on both sides of the border, that jurisdictional 
lines on the map notwithstanding, they share a common airshed, common 
watersheds, a common home for migratory birds and fish, and common 
urban growth pressures.199  This recognition followed a number of 
successful sector-specific arrangements, both formal and informal, 
involving shared fish stocks and concerns with oil spills.  It also drew on 
earlier efforts of the federal, provincial, and state governments on both 
sides of the border in advancing an ecosystem-based approach, and 
hence transboundary management, in the Puget Sound-Georgia Basin 
area.  The spin-off effects of the formal efforts at collaboration have been 
remarkable with informal non-governmental partnerships, First Nation 
and tribal interests, and a host of other networks complementing the 
efforts of the government and oftentimes taking the lead in securing a 
more sustainable future for the area. 
As noted by Hildebrand et al., these efforts have led to a cross-
jurisdictional sense of community among the residents of the shared 
ecosystem.200  However, there are still a number of challenges to 
overcome for the full potential of these collaborative efforts to be 
realized.  First, there is a need to ensure that transboundary partnerships 
are afforded the credibility and legitimacy required to be able to access 
resources and be assigned priority by responsible agencies in their 
planning processes.  Second, it is essential to begin to move beyond the 
current level of arrangements to one in which a more comprehensive and 
more fully integrated system for transboundary cooperation can take 
place. 
V. BI-NATIONAL POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE GULF OF MAINE 
Over the past decade, there has been an increasing recognition that 
effective ocean management requires an integrated approach that serves 
to balance the carrying capacity of the natural system with human 
demands and considers the impacts of all ocean sectors on the marine 
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environment.201  Furthermore, as described in Part III above, both Canada 
and the United States have individually embraced the notion of 
ecosystem-based management as a fundamental principle for addressing 
coastal and ocean-related impacts in an integrated manner and for 
reconciling multiple use conflicts at different geographic scales.  From a 
collaborative perspective, the two countries have demonstrated efforts to 
adopt and implement an ecosystem-based approach in the Georgia Basin-
Puget Sound Initiative and in the evolving arrangements surrounding the 
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, as described in Part IV above.  
This final section of the Article discusses a suite of transboundary 
policy objectives for the Gulf of Maine in general and Georges Bank in 
particular.  It then provides some justification as to why these should be 
pursued at a bi-national level and explores a possible mechanism for 
meeting these objectives through the adoption of a more holistic 
approach to marine resource management for the Gulf of Maine.  
A. Suite of Transboundary Policy Objectives 
Having analyzed both the historical and current context surrounding 
U.S.-Canada relations in the Gulf of Maine, driven in large measure by 
the socioeconomic benefits provided by the shared ecosystem, we now 
focus on a suite of policy objectives that encompasses both existing 
interests (the fisheries) and potentially new or emerging ones (non-
renewable and renewable energy).  In identifying these objectives, we 
have constrained ourselves to those issues that would be regional, 
ecosystemic, and tranboundary in scope.  As such, policy objectives 
around issues that are localized within the state or province, although 
these may be extremely important and may even be common among the 
respective jurisdictions, are not discussed here.202  
1. Shared Objectives for the Gulf of Maine Fisheries  
As has been noted repeatedly in this Article, the shared fisheries in 
the Gulf of Maine have been the central focus for discussion between the 
United States and Canada for decades, and, it has been argued, were a 
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principal factor behind the decision to seek a judgment from the ICJ.  
Furthermore, current sectoral efforts between the two countries in 
managing the shared stocks appear to lend credence to a shared policy 
objective that would recognize the historical and socio-economic 
significance of the fisheries to this region, while seeking to jointly 
support stock rebuilding efforts.  Linked to achieving these objectives is 
the need to take into account cumulative impacts, protect critical habitat 
for fish and other sensitive areas, and understand carrying capacity.  Of 
particular importance is the need to fill knowledge gaps regarding the 
Georges Bank ecosystem.  This important Bank still serves as a lucrative 
fishing ground, despite losses to landings, income, employment, and 
consumer benefits that would have been realized if the catch of 
groundfish were at their long term potential level instead of being 
reduced due primarily to overfishing.203  At the same time, existing 
knowledge on ecosystemic connectivity across the Hague Line is being 
increasingly recognized and the precautionary approach called for, so as 
to influence ocean management decision-making. 
2. New Economic Uses 
The main transboundary policy objective regarding new economic 
uses in the Gulf is the requirement to minimize negative impacts from 
these activities on other users of the area as well as the environment 
itself.  Potential new uses include petroleum exploitation, natural gas 
transshipment, renewable energy development, and ocean farming.  
In the debate surrounding petroleum exploitation and the Georges 
Bank moratorium, concerns were raised over the potential environmental 
impacts associated with all phases of petroleum exploitation.204  During 
the exploratory phase, the effects of seismic-generated noise on marine 
mammals and fish behavior and mortality, at different stages of 
development, were identified.  During exploratory and development 
drilling, the impacts arising from the release of drilling muds and 
cuttings, particularly on the lucrative scallop fishery, were cause for 
concern. At the production phase, the effects of produced water 
containing petroleum, heavy metal, and/or naturally occurring 
radioactive elements, on the commercially exploited biological resources 
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were raised.  Also associated with the production phase was concern over 
the effects of petroleum spillage, whether through blowouts, chronic 
pipeline failure, or tanker accidents.  While many of these concerns were 
applicable to any area of the offshore, they assumed an even greater 
significance when applied to the Georges Bank debate.  This was due to 
the additional perceived linkages between the physical and biological 
processes occurring on the Bank and the belief that Georges Bank 
provided seed stock for other fishing areas in the region.  As such, any 
disruption to these processes was seen as exacerbating the negative 
consequences of any catastrophic event that might occur on the fishery.   
Additional challenges to this transboundary policy objective from the 
non-renewable energy sector include the issue surrounding transshipment 
of liquefied natural gas in the waters of the Gulf and the threats to iconic 
species and humans in the event of ship strikes and more serious 
catastrophes.  Of particular concern is the proposed project by Downeast 
LNG Inc., to be located in Washington County, Maine.  The project 
would also include the transit of LNG vessels through both United States 
and Canadian waters to and from the LNG terminal in Robbinston, 
Maine.  The intended vessel transit routes include the waters of the Gulf 
of Maine, Bay of Fundy, Grand Manan Channel, Head Harbor Passage, 
Friar Roads, Western Passage, and Passamaquoddy Bay. 
Regarding the potential negative impacts that could arise from 
emerging activities associated with the renewable energy sector in the 
Gulf, there is limited specific knowledge to draw on.  However, with the 
proposals increasing for wind-related projects and the emerging use of 
hydrokinetics as a source of renewable energy, these uses could 
challenge the achievement of the shared policy objective of minimizing 
impacts to existing users and the environment in the Gulf of Maine area.  
Similarly, by taking a proactive approach to anticipating the 
transboundary consequences of ocean farming in the Gulf of Maine, 
potential areas of conflict can be minimized.  
3. Co-existence  
It could be argued that the drawing of the Hague Line provided the 
legal basis for encouraging co-existence by Canada and the United States 
in the Gulf of Maine.  However, the administrative boundary holds little 
relevance when addressing ecosystem-wide issues, and the need to 
achieve a transboundary policy objective concerning the use of principles 
of equity and fairness in the allocation of resource use and space in the 
Gulf is evident.  The naïve assumption that all demands on a given 
ecosystem can be met ignores the inherent conflicting nature between 
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many ocean activities and the underlying fact that “[w]here multiple 
desirable but competing objectives exist, it is not possible to maximize 
each . . . [and] in any system with multiple competing objectives, it will 
not be possible to meet every one.”205  
The debate between just two ocean users—the fisheries and the non-
renewable energy sector in the Gulf of Maine—has led to a decision that 
favored the former use over the latter on both sides of the Hague Line.  
The message conveyed by this decision was that co-existence was not 
possible if the public good was to be served.  However, with new and 
emerging uses of the ocean environment being developed and the 
impacts arising from the broader policy environment surrounding climate 
change, population growth, and energy security, the influences shaping 
decision-making are likely to become more complex.  Given this 
scenario, it is logical to explore approaches that would allow for these 
transboundary policy objectives to be achieved while permitting the 
effective and efficient use of shared marine resources in the Gulf of 
Maine.  
B. Achieving the Transboundary Policy Objectives 
There are numerous factors which support our belief that these 
objectives for the Gulf of Maine should be pursued in a bi-national 
context, not the least of which was the explicit expectation by the Judges 
of the Chamber for collaboration between these two “friendly” nations.  
However, as has been noted in the case of shared fisheries management 
and with regard to the ecosystem-wide activities on the Pacific coast and 
the focus on water quality as an issue of concern in the Great Lakes, 
these efforts have resulted in less than stellar accomplishments.   
We suggest that one mechanism that could serve the needs of both 
countries while addressing previous shortcomings is to develop and 
implement a cooperative bi-national agreement for marine spatial 
planning (MSP) for Georges Bank.  This spatial area is identified rather 
than the entire Gulf of Maine as a means of taking a “learning by doing” 
approach to the pursuit of shared policy objectives that is ecosystemic, 
rather than sector or issue specific.  We submit that Georges Bank has 
many of the characteristics that have been identified as benefiting from 
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the application of an MSP approach.206  These include: areas with high 
levels of activity in order to balance competing activities and ensure 
sustainable use of the oceans; areas where the likely increase of activity 
in the region and the potential to negatively and irreversibly affect the 
ecosystem (natural and human subsystems) is high; and areas in which 
there is a wealth of existing knowledge (scientific and local) of the area.  
Furthermore, focusing on a joint deliverable that is tractable yet adopts 
current thinking in integrated oceans management, displays international 
cooperative leadership on the part of both countries.  It also demonstrates 
to individual sectoral stakeholders that a single sector focus to decision-
making is no longer acceptable nor capable of meaningfully addressing 
the needs of any one particular sector, let alone the entire suite of 
legitimate ocean users in an era of principled oceans governance.207  This 
proposal also addresses a current stated priority for MSP in the United 
States and, to a growing extent, Canada, and as such, is potentially 
consistent with directives at the highest levels of decision-making.  It is 
consistent with UNLOSC articles respecting sovereign rights and powers 
of coastal states while demonstrating the obligation of the duty to 
cooperate in transboundary related matters.  It adds scientific objective 
rationale to decision-making regarding the use of the marine resources 
and has the potential to be viewed as an acceptable process by all 
stakeholders.  Most importantly, we suggest that an acceptable champion 
in the form of the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment 
(GOMCME or the Council) exists to advance and successfully lead this 
initiative. 
C. Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment 
The GOMCME was established in 1989 by an agreement signed by 
the Governors of Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire and the 
Premiers of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to cooperatively work to 
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achieve sustainable development in the Gulf region, protect natural 
resources, enhance environmental quality, and maintain the ecological 
balance of the Gulf.208  The establishment of the Council came about 
following the recognition that, as a shared resource to the residents of the 
area, there was no complementary governance structure in place to 
coordinate issues of common concern at the ecosystemic level.  As such, 
the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment is the only 
transboundary, regional-scale governance institution in the Gulf of 
Maine which focuses on coordination of the marine-related activities of 
state and provincial governments in the region.  The Council is supported 
by a Working Group of state/provincial/federal planners and resource 
managers, and five committees: Data & Information Management; 
Environmental Quality Monitoring; Habitat; Aquaculture; and Public 
Education and Participation.  Operations of the Council are assisted by a 
Secretariat that rotates among the five jurisdictions on an annual basis, as 
does the chairmanship of the Council.209  However, it is important to 
recognize that the GOMCME serves only a coordinating function and is 
not currently responsible for management decisions.  These 
responsibilities rest with the agencies and departments that serve the 
members of the Council. 
We argue that it is precisely because of its coordinating mandate that 
the Council is uniquely positioned to focus on issues that require or 
benefit significantly from regional coordination.  As such a 
transboundary organization, with existing mechanisms of collaboration at 
the municipal, state, provincial, national, and bi-national levels, the 
Council can facilitate progress towards common goals.  Additionally, by 
assigning the specific role of coordinating MSP development and 
implementation for Georges Bank to the GOMCME, the existing 
challenge of attribution for work done by the Council which currently 
exists can be addressed.  
It is not the intent of this Article to resolve all of the necessary 
administrative, legal, and technical issues required to move forward on 
our suggestion but rather to raise the issue for further consideration and 
possible adoption.  It is worth noting that the Council itself has been 
exploring the value of pursuing more formal agreements among its 
members.210  As such, answers to questions such as—what purpose 
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exactly will an agreement serve; what opportunities might come from 
having such a tool implemented; when is an agreement likely to be 
supported; who needs to be convinced—can be specifically focused 
around a discussion of MSP on Georges Bank.   
D. Challenges and Opportunities 
Zoning is a term and concept typically applied to real property and 
thus conjures the notion of private property interests, a notion not 
comfortably acceptable to many who rightly view the ocean as public 
property held in trust by the government.  One challenge to marine 
planning, therefore, is the notion that entities will acquire rights to use 
particular segments of the ocean in a private-property-like manner, to the 
discomfort of many citizens.211  An additional challenge to marine spatial 
planning is its three-dimensional nature, requiring extensive data on 
multiple physical, chemical, biological, and even legal parameters.212  
Lastly, in the case of the Gulf of Maine, there is the real challenge 
discussed at length herein that actions by one nation in a shared water 
body significantly impact the resources and ecosystem of the waters of 
the neighboring nation.  Accordingly, planning of transboundary waters 
should be undertaken in a bilateral effort, but such efforts are difficult to 
coordinate and their outcomes are very hard to enforce. 
The opportunities presented by involving the Gulf of Maine Council 
on the Marine Environment in each nation’s developing coastal marine 
spatial planning efforts are sufficiently rewarding, however, to overcome 
the challenges.  The GOMCME is already engaged in trans-boundary 
scientific data gathering, even working to map the entirety of the Gulf of 
Maine basin.213  The councilors making up the GOMCME represent 
federal, state, provincial, and non-governmental organization sectors, as 
well as the general public, from Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Maine, 
New Hampshire, and Massachusetts.214  They represent the authorities as 
well as the individual councilors likely to be called upon to serve on 
regional planning bodies in both countries.  In other words, the proposed 
U.S. CMSP calls for regional planning efforts to include “indigenous 
community representatives with jurisdictional responsibilities or other 
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interests . . . relevant to CMSP for that region.”215  The GOMCME is 
ready-made for that role. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the Gulf of Maine, the United States and Canada share common 
concerns about fisheries resources, the impact of global climate change, 
and the potential for ocean-based energy development.  Although the ICJ 
decision setting the boundary between the countries established territorial 
rights and governance jurisdictions for fishing and energy development, 
among other things, it could not shield either nation from the impacts of 
the other’s activities in the Gulf.  After all, the ocean is fluid and three-
dimensional; its ecosystems are delicate, complex and interdependent; its 
resources are opaque and mobile; and its physical and chemical 
properties are affected by coastal and in-shore activities from afar, as 
well as ocean-based ones.  Oceans do not lend themselves well to neat 
boundaries and limited jurisdictional authority.  As each country has 
learned, moreover, managing the ocean sector-by-sector also does not 
work.  Accordingly, both the United States and Canada have pledged to 
manage their respective ocean waters through “integrated management” 
whereby multiple agencies with myriad responsibilities are obliged to 
coordinate their activities toward a common, collective set of goals.  
Both countries have adopted principles of sustainability, and plan to 
govern using the precautionary principle, ecosystem-based management 
approaches, and sound scientific data.  They also intend to make public 
participation the cornerstone of their ocean governance plans.  
Given the common policy interests of both nations, then, it seems 
logical and appropriate for the United States and Canada to actively and 
progressively involve representatives from each other’s relevant agencies 
when determining coastal and marine spatial planning regions and 
establishing their governing bodies.  It would be appropriate for the Gulf 
of Maine Council on the Marine Environment in particular to be 
officially engaged in the CMSP efforts for the Gulf of Maine.  The 
GOMCME is the only transboundary, regional-scale governance 
institution in the Gulf of Maine which focuses on coordination of the 
marine-related activities of state and provincial governments in the 
region.  Should it be tapped to engage in U.S. and Canadian CMSP with 
regard to the Gulf of Maine, the GOMCME may serve as a model for 
similar transnational regional bodies to govern CMSP in other boundary 
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waters between the United States and Canada, or even between other 
nations with shared marine boundaries. 
